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ABSTRACT

Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with
ambiguous statutes. This paper investigates the crucial and analytically prior question of
what ambiguity in law is. Does a claim that a text is ambiguous mean the judge is
uncertain about its meaning? Or is it a claim that ordinary readers of English, as a group,
would disagree about what the text means? This distinction is of considerable theoretical
interest. It also turns out to be highly consequential as a practical matter.
To demonstrate, we developed a survey instrument for exploring determinations
of ambiguity and administered it to nearly 1,000 law students. We find that asking
respondents whether a statute is “ambiguous” in their own minds produces answers that
are strongly biased by their policy preferences. But asking respondents whether the text
would likely be read the same way by ordinary readers of English does not produce
answers biased in this way. This discrepancy leads to important questions about which of
those two ways of thinking about ambiguity is more legally relevant. It also has potential
implications for how cases are decided and for how law is taught.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Determinations of ambiguity are the linchpin of statutory interpretation. The
existence of ambiguity creates the need for interpretation in the first place, of course, but
it does much else besides. For example, courts often treat ambiguity as a kind of gateway
consideration when they interpret a statute. If the statute is ambiguous, the judge might
then become interested in sources of guidance, such as legislative history, that wouldn’t
otherwise be considered.1 Or ambiguity might cause a judge to defer to an agency’s view
of the statute, as under the Chevron doctrine.2 Or ambiguity might cause a judge to resort
to a canon of construction such as the rule of lenity,3 or the doctrine that courts should

1

See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994) (“we do not resort to legislative history to

cloud a statutory text that is clear”); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992); Schwegmann Brothers v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring) (“Resort to legislative history is
only justified where the face of the [statute] is inescapably ambiguous.”). The principle is hoary; see
United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 399, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805) (“Where a law is plain and unambiguous,
whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they
have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.”).
2

See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“if the statute is

silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”). See also Thomas J. Miles and Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi L. Rev.
823, n. 26 (2006) (finding that most invalidations of agency action involve disputes about whether a statute
is ambiguous).
3

See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); for more discussion and sources, see infra text

accompanying note 40.
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prefer interpretations of ambiguous statutes that avoid difficult constitutional issues,4 or
the rule that ambiguous statutes will be interpreted to avoid conflict with foreign law,5 or
many others. Ambiguity also serves as an occasion for judges to consult their own views
of policy, whether openly, quietly, or unconsciously.6
Most of the literature on legal interpretation talks about the points just mentioned:
what judges should do after they find ambiguity. In this Article we propose to take a
different approach in two respects. First, our concern is with anterior questions, starting
with what ambiguity is; for the word itself is ambiguous. To say a statute is ambiguous
could be a claim that ordinary readers of English would disagree about its meaning,
which we will call an external judgment. Or it could be a private conclusion that,
regardless of what others might think, the reader is unsure how best to read the text—
which we will call an internal judgment. This ambiguity about ambiguity is latent; courts
generally talk about whether a statute is ambiguous without making clear whether they
are making internal or external judgments. One question posed in this Article is whether

4

See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S 116, 130 (1958).

5

The so-called “Charming Betsy” canon; see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64

(1804).
6

See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L. J.

2580, 2587 (2006) (discussing role of policy judgments in interpreting ambiguous statutes); Richard A.
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and
Culture 235, 250-51 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (arguing that judicial policy judgments are inevitable
when statutes are ambiguous); Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s
Criminal Docket, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 84-87 (discussing implicit policy judgments in cases where both
sides have plausible textual arguments).
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the choice between those perspectives makes any difference, or whether the conclusions
produced by the two kinds of judgments would likely be the same. Another question
addressed here is whether the policy preferences that interpreters hold affect the
probability that they will find a text ambiguous in either of the senses just sketched.
This Article also takes a different approach to legal interpretation in a second
respect: it examines the activity empirically. The literature on interpretation of legal
texts—statutes, regulations, contracts—is very extensive, but the discussion usually is
theoretical; the subject has not received experimental attention, so we know very little
about how legal texts are actually read and understood by different sorts of people. The
questions raised in this Article present an excellent opportunity to redress this imbalance
and introduce empirical study into the field of legal interpretation. This we have done by
use of a sophisticated survey instrument that presents respondents with a series of simple
but potentially ambiguous statutes to interpret. The survey invites its takers to make
judgments of various kinds about how the texts of the statutes apply to fact patterns from
real cases. Different versions of the survey include many variations both large and
subtle; these variations enable us to determine whether different ways of thinking and
talking about ambiguity produce different opinions about its presence or absence, and to
see what relationship those judgments have to the underlying policy preferences of those
making them. We have administered the survey to nearly a thousand law students, some
at the start of their legal education and others further along in it. This mix of respondents
allows us to compare the interpretive behavior of literate but untutored readers to those
who have had some formal training in legal method.

5

We find that judgments made about ambiguity from the internal and external
perspectives are quite different, and that making either judgment well involves serious
and underappreciated challenges.

When respondents with strong policy preferences

make internal judgments about ambiguity, they tend to say that the statute is
unambiguous, or that only one reading of it is plausible; in other words, when they say
whether they themselves find the statute clear, their preferences appear to bias their
judgments. When they make external judgments—i.e., about whether ordinary readers
would agree about the statute’s meaning—the good news is that there is little correlation
between those judgments and their policy preferences. The bad news is that external
judgments are often hard to make accurately. But internal judgments are even harder to
make accurately, at least along dimensions that are possible to measure. So in these
results we find support for the idea that in at least some circumstances, judgments of
ambiguity are best made by estimating how clear a statutory text would be to an ordinary
reader of English. And we find, finally, that neither the interpretive judgments made by
our respondents nor their vulnerability to infection by policy preferences are significantly
affected by a year of law school.

II.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

We proceeded by administering survey instruments to roughly 900 law students—
some at the start of their first year and some at the end of it, at Boston University, the
University of Chicago, and the University of Virginia. The surveys were filled out
anonymously, and participation was not required. The specific purpose of the survey was
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not explained; the students were simply told that it was part of a study of the
interpretation of legal texts.
Each page of the survey presented the taker of it with a statute, described some
facts to which the statute might apply, and set out contrasting positions on the question
taken by the parties to the case in which the facts arose. The survey then asked, in one
form or another, how clear the statute was in the setting described; some respondents
were asked for internal judgments, and others for external. All respondents were then
also asked which reading of the statute they preferred as a matter of policy. The statutes
and facts used in the survey were taken from real Supreme Court cases involving federal
criminal law.
The surveys contained 11 different statutory cases. Here we review three of these
cases in detail. The results are representative of those for the remaining eight, which we
report in the appendix.

Example 1 – LSD case. Here is one fact pattern7 from the survey:

A federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), provides for a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years for anyone who distributes more than one gram of a
"mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD)." The defendant was caught distributing LSD that had been
dissolved and sprayed onto blotter paper. The weight of the LSD alone was 50

7

Based on Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). The Court held, 7-2, that the weight of the

blotter paper should be included in determining the defendant’s sentence.

7

milligrams, well below the statutory threshold. But if the weight of the blotter
paper was included, the total weight was five grams, well above the statutory
threshold.

The question is whether, under § 841(b), the blotter paper should be included in
deciding, for purposes of sentencing, the weight of the LSD the defendant
distributed. Under the defendant's reading of the statute, the blotter paper should
not be included in deciding the weight. Under the government's reading, it should
be included in deciding the weight.

The respondents were then asked a question about the statute’s clarity; different
respondents were asked different versions of the question. Some were asked whether the
statute was ambiguous as applied (we will refer to this as the “ambiguous” question):

Do you think the statute, as applied to these facts, is ambiguous?
A) Completely ambiguous: it is impossible to say which reading is better.
B) Moderately ambiguous: either reading is reasonable, but one is slightly better.
C) Moderately clear: there is some room for doubt, but one reading is decidedly
better.
D) Completely clear: one of the readings is obviously right.

Some were asked whether two readings were plausible (the “plausible” question):

8

Do you think that the readings offered by both sides are plausible?
A) Absolutely: each side's reading is entirely plausible, and it is impossible to say
which reading is better.
B) Probably: each side's reading seems plausible, but one is slightly better.
C) Probably not: one could strain to find multiple plausible readings, but one
reading is decidedly better.
D) No: the text has only one plausible reading.

And some were asked whether ordinary readers would disagree about the correct reading
(the “ordinary readers” question):

Do you think ordinary readers of English would disagree about which side's
reading of the statute is better?
(A) Yes: there would be widespread disagreement about which side's reading was
better.
(B) Probably: there would probably be a good deal of disagreement about which
side's reading was better.
(C) Probably not: there would be some disagreement, though most people would
agree about which side's reading was better.
(D) No: everyone would agree about which side's reading was better.

All respondents were also asked which litigant should win as a matter of policy:

9

Setting aside what the statute says, which outcome do you prefer as a matter of
policy?
(A) Strongly prefer that the defendant win
(B) Mildly prefer that the defendant win
(C) Mildly prefer that the government win
(D) Strongly prefer that the government win

Figure 1 shows how the responses to the three different questions about ambiguity
related to the policy preferences the respondents stated. The x-axis tracks respondents
with different policy preferences over the outcome of the case (strongly prefer the
defendant wins to strongly prefer the government wins). The y-axis tracks ambiguity
ratings from (not ambiguous to ambiguous).
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Ambiguous
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ambiguous

Ambiguous
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Not
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Figure 1. How policy preferences affect answers to three kinds of questions about ambiguity in the
LSD case (example 1). The lines show mean ambiguity ratings. The whiskers report standard errors
of the means.

The curved bottom line shows the pattern of results when the respondents were asked
whether the statute was ambiguous as applied to the facts. The curved middle line shows
the pattern when the respondents were asked whether both sides’ readings were plausible.
The top line—the relatively straight one—shows their responses when asked whether
ordinary readers of English would disagree on how the statute should be read. The level
of the top line relative to the level of the curved lines suggests that how one is asked
about the existence of ambiguity affects judgments about whether it exists. In particular,
asking respondents whether ordinary readers would find agree about the meaning of a
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statutory text is more likely to elicit a finding of ambiguity than asking respondents
whether they themselves regard it ambiguous. Moreover, the curves of the bottom two
lines—the way they “frown”—shows that policy preferences are entwined with them:
the more strongly respondents feel about the case as a matter of policy (whether the
preference is for the government or defendant to prevail) the less ambiguous they are
likely to say the statute is.

But policy preferences are not likewise entwined with

judgments about how likely ordinary readers would be to agree on the statute’s meaning.

Example 2 – Child pornography case. Here is another of the survey questions:8

A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, reads in part as follows:
“(a) Any person who—
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if—
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and

8

Adapted from United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). The Court held, 7-2, that the

government had to prove that the defendant knew that the films he sold included sexually explicit acts by
minors. We presented the case to our respondents in a form a bit different, and a bit simpler, than the form
it took in the Supreme Court. In the actual X-Citement Video case, it was the defendant who argued that the
scienter requirement did not reach the age of the performers in the movies—because he claimed this made
the statute unconstitutional. Since we did not wish to engage the constitutional question, we wrote the
survey question to suggest that the defendant argued for a reading of the statute that made it harder to get a
conviction under it. For more discussion, see infra.
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(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.”

The defendant was accused of violating the statute by selling pornographic
videotapes that included footage of a woman who was under the age of 18, and
thus was a minor. He defended on the ground that when he sold the tape, he did
not know the person on the tape was a minor.

The question is whether the word "knowingly" in section (1) applies to the phrase
"the use of a minor" in section (1)(a). The defendant's reading is that "knowingly"
does modify "the use of a minor." The government's reading is that "knowingly"
does not modify "the use of a minor."

Again the respondents were asked to assess the ambiguity of the statute as applied to the
facts, and again the question was put to them in different ways. Some were asked
whether the statute was ambiguous, some were asked whether both proposed readings
seemed plausible, and some were asked whether they thought ordinary readers of English
would disagree about which was the better reading of the text. All respondents were also
asked which result they preferred as a matter of policy. The results here were similar to
the results shown a moment ago:
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Figure 2. How policy preferences affect answers to three kinds of questions about ambiguity in the
child pornography case (example 2). The lines show mean ambiguity ratings. The whiskers report
standard errors of the means.

Example 3 – False statement case. A third question9 read as follows:

The federal "false statements" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, says:
"Whoever knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent

9

Based on United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984). The Court held for the government, 5-4, that

knowledge of the federal agency’s jurisdiction on Yermian’s part was not needed to support his conviction.
For more discussion, see infra.
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statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
if the matter lies within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both."

The defendant worked for a company that had a contract with the Department of
Defense. The company asked him to fill out a questionnaire to obtain a security
clearance. He did so. His company mailed the questionnaire to the Department
of Defense. The Department discovered that the defendant's answers contained
false statements. He was charged with violating the statute quoted above. His
defense was that he had not realized that his questionnaire would to be forwarded
to the government.

The question is whether the statute requires proof that a defendant knew the
matter in question was within the jurisdiction of a government agency. The
defendant's reading is that the statute does require such proof. The government's
reading is that it does not require such proof.

Respondents were asked the usual questions in the usual ways, and with the now-usual
results:
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Figure 3. How policy preferences affect answers to three kinds of questions about ambiguity in the
false statement case (example 3). The lines present mean ambiguity ratings. The whiskers report
standard errors of the means.

We confirmed the graphical results for the cases above with linear regression
analysis and non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests.

Specifically, we regressed

ambiguity ratings (on a scale of 1-4, where 1 indicates a response of “Not Ambiguous”
and 4 indicates “Ambiguous”) on indicators for each of the four questions interacted with
indicators for different policy preferences.

(Main effects for questions and policy

preferences are omitted.) We did this separately for each case and then for all cases
combined. The results are presented in Table 1. The coefficient estimates provide a
measure to compare the level of ambiguity ratings across questions and policy
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preferences when those ratings are treated as a cardinal measure of judgment about
ambiguity.
Table 1. Regression of ambiguity rating on policy preferences by question and case.
Child
False
All cases
LSD
pornography statement
2.023***
2.011***
2.184***
1.930***
(0.056)
(0.088)
(0.118)
(0.091)
Mildly Pro-D
2.548***
2.333***
2.579***
2.693***
(0.046)
(0.086)
(0.085)
(0.068)
Mildly Pro-G
2.373***
2.311***
2.389***
2.395***
(0.041)
(0.090)
(0.066)
(0.063)
Strongly Pro-G
1.914***
1.977***
2.007***
1.761***
(0.047)
(0.129)
(0.068)
(0.074)
Plausible
Strongly Pro-D
2.182***
2.061***
2.333***
2.276***
(0.082)
(0.122)
(0.181)
(0.143)
Mildly Pro-D
2.678***
2.647***
2.735***
2.680***
(0.062)
(0.104)
(0.142)
(0.089)
Mildly Pro-G
2.756***
2.614***
2.727***
2.887***
(0.062)
(0.129)
(0.102)
(0.098)
Strongly Pro-G
2.237***
2.037***
2.397***
2.000***
(0.075)
(0.164)
(0.101)
(0.160)
Ord. Readers
Strongly Pro-D
2.742***
2.660***
2.765***
2.880***
(0.087)
(0.124)
(0.201)
(0.154)
Mildly Pro-D
2.745***
2.589***
2.815***
2.862***
(0.069)
(0.114)
(0.160)
(0.101)
Mildly Pro-G
2.673***
2.667***
2.676***
2.672***
(0.063)
(0.132)
(0.101)
(0.098)
Strongly Pro-G
2.737***
2.667***
2.765***
2.765***
(0.084)
(0.164)
(0.116)
(0.186)
Purpose
Strongly Pro-D
2.217***
2.217***
(0.171)
(0.173)
Mildly Pro-D
2.684***
2.684***
(0.188)
(0.190)
Mildly Pro-G
2.615***
2.615***
(0.227)
(0.230)
Strongly Pro-G
2.667***
2.667***
(0.334)
(0.339)
Obs.
2,356
688
864
804
Adj. R-squared
0.898
0.885
0.898
0.912
Notes. Dependent variable is ambiguity rating (1 = not ambiguous, 4 = completely
ambiguous). Pro-D means pro-defendant and pro-G means pro-government. Standard
errors are reported below coefficient estimates. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance
at 10/5/1% level.
Question
Ambiguous

Policy
Preference
Strongly Pro-D
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In order to determine whether ambiguity ratings across questions and policy
preferences are statistically significant, we compared ambiguity ratings using a Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test. This test asks whether the ambiguity ratings from one policy preference
group (question) is drawn from the same distribution as the ratings from another policy
preference group (question). The advantage of such a test over a t-test based on linear
regression results is that it is robust to monotonic transformations of the ambiguity rating
variable. In other words, it does not require assuming those ratings have a cardinal value,
e.g., that the gap between ambiguous and not ambiguous is exactly 4 times the gap
between ambiguous and somewhat ambiguous. The results are presented across two
panels of Table 2. Panel A examines one question at a time and compares ambiguity
ratings across policy preference groups.

This is equivalent to determining the

significance of horizontal movements along any given line in Figures 1 - 3.10 The second
table holds constant policy preference and compares ambiguity ratings across questions.
This is equivalent to determining the significance of purely vertical movements across
lines in Figures 1-3.11
Table 2. Statistical significance of differences in ambiguity ratings across policy preference groups
and across questions.
Panel A: Comparing groups with different policy preferences

Question
Ambiguous

10

Strongly pro-D v.
Mildly
Mildly Strongly
pro-D
Pro-G
pro-G
0.000
0.000
0.137

Mildly pro-D v.
Mildly Strongly
Pro-G
pro-G
0.013
0.000

Mildly Pro-G
v. Strongly
pro-G
0.000

For example, the difference between ambiguity ratings of strongly pro-defendant and strongly pro-

government respondents on the ordinary readers question has a p-value of 0.882.
11

For example, the difference between ambiguity ratings in response to the ambiguity and to the ordinary

readers questions among strongly pro-defendant respondents has a p-value of <0.001.
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Plausible
Ord. Readers
Purpose

Policy
preference
Strongly Pro-D
Mildly Pro-D
Mildly Pro-G
Strongly Pro-G

0.000
0.994
0.109

0.000
0.685
0.334
0.000
0.000
0.476
0.882
0.338
0.810
0.595
0.249
0.270
0.778
0.973
0.818
Panel B: Comparing responses to different questions
Ambiguous v.
Plausible v.
Ord. Readers
Ord.
Ord.
v. Purpose
Plausible Readers Purpose
Readers Purpose
0.156
0.000
0.346
0.000
0.887
0.019
0.081
0.027
0.523
0.481
0.965
0.803
0.000
0.000
0.459
0.202
0.460
0.720
0.001
0.000
0.041
0.000
0.256
0.982

Notes. Cells contain p-values from Wilcoxon Rank Sum test comparing the indicated groups or
categories. Pro-D means pro-defendant and pro-G means pro-government.

Consistent with Figures 1-3, the regression analysis in Table 1 combined with the
equivalence-of-distribution tests in Table 2 reveal, first, that respondents asked whether
ordinary readers would agree about the meaning of a statute ambiguous are significantly
more likely to find ambiguity (see Panel B).12 Second, respondents with moderate views
are significantly more likely to find ambiguity than those with extreme views when asked
whether a statute is ambiguous as applied or whether different interpretations are
plausible (see Panel A). When asked whether ordinary readers would agree about a
statute’s meaning, respondents with different policy views did not have different views of
ambiguity that were at all significant.
Before interpreting these findings, we should address three potential limitations of
our survey. First, there is some possible ambiguity in the way the survey questions

12

While it is reasonable to compare the relative ambiguity ratings across respondents and across questions,

one should be cautious about drawing conclusions about the absolute level of ambiguity of the statutes in
our surveys. Because the survey questions present opposing arguments about the proper legal
interpretation of the statutes, for example, respondents may find more ambiguity here than would have been
found by others who were not recently confronted with those opposing arguments.
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themselves were phrased.

For example, the multiple choice options following the

questions ask subjects about which reading is “better” without qualifying that “better”
should be judged from the perspective of legal interpretation. It is possible that some
respondents judged readings “better” from, say, a policy perspective rather than as a
matter of text. This seems unlikely, as the fact patterns leading up to the answer choices
present the dispute as one about textual meaning; and those questions about which
reading is “better” were always followed by others that told the respondent to then set
aside the text and just consider which they prefer as a matter of policy. But the most
important point is that even if this ambiguity did cause any confusion, the confusion was
common to all of the questions: the multiple choice answers to all of the ambiguityrelated questions use the same “better” phrasing,13 so we can comfortably make
comparisons between the answers that those questions tended to produce. The problem
might persists if the word “better” created measurement error and the measurement error
were itself correlated with subjects’ policy preferences or with the type of ambiguityrelated question asked. But we see no reason to imagine that either is so.
Second, it might seem inappropriate to interpret the correlation between policy
preference and judgments of ambiguity as meaning that the former cause the latter.14

13

The only asymmetry in the use of “better” across questions is that the ambiguous-as-applied and the

plausible-reading questions do not use the term “better” in option D, which offers the extreme answer of no
ambiguity or only one plausible reading, respectively.
14

While we believe that causation does likely run from policy preference to ambiguity rating, we are

agnostic about the specific causal mechanism at work. It is possible that respondents’ strong policy
preferences directly lead them to rate statutory text as unambiguous so that their legal interpretations
conform to their wishes about the outcomes. Alternatively, it is possible that respondents’ strong policy
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Perhaps a respondent’s ambiguity rating somehow causes his or her policy preference.
But there are two good reasons for doubting that reverse causality is a problem. First, the
“policy preference” question asks respondents to set aside the text of the statute when
reporting their policy preference. In other words, respondents are asked what their policy
preference would be without the influence of their ambiguity rating; so if respondents
were following instructions, their views about the ambiguity of a statute would not have
influenced their reported policy preference. Second, the distribution of respondents’
reported policy preferences are inconsistent with reverse causality. Reverse causality
implies that if two questions elicit different ambiguity ratings, then those questions
should also elicit different policy preferences, since the ambiguity ratings produce the
policy preferences. But the data are otherwise. For example, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that
the “ordinary readers” question elicits higher ambiguity ratings, on average, than other
questions.

Reverse causality implies that the ordinary readers question should also

therefore elicit different policy preferences than other questions.

We test this by

comparing the distribution of policy preferences across the ordinary readers and other
questions using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Table 3 presents the results. Each cell
reports the p-value of a pairwise comparison of questions for a given case. Preference
distributions across the ordinary readers question and the other questions do not

preferences lead them to place more weight on one side’s legal arguments about the correct interpretation
of a statute, which indirectly causes them to rate statutes as unambiguous—though our questions generally
stated positions without much discussin of the arguments behind them. Our discussion of the implications
of the survey does not hinge on any particular mechanism of causation, and indeed—as noted in the text—
it does not generally depend on a finding of causation at all.

21

significantly differ except when respondents who are asked the “ordinary readers”
question are compared to respondents asked the “ambiguous as applied” question after
the false statement case (p = 0.015). Even in that instance, it is unlikely there is reverse
causality; for while the ambiguity ratings elicited by the “plausible” question and the
“ordinary readers” question differ, the preference distributions of respondents asked these
two questions do not (p = 0.773).
Table 3. Statistical significance of differences in policy preferences across questions, by topic.
Comparing policy preferences across questions
Ambiguous v. Ambiguous v. Plausible v.
Case
Plausible
Ord. Readers Ord. Readers
LSD
0.949
0.778
0.849
Child pornography
0.482
0.757
0.731
False statement
0.005
0.015
0.773
Notes. Cells contain p-values from Wilcoxon Rank Sum test
comparing the indicated categories.

Even if there is no reverse causality, perhaps there is something else, such as
ambiguity aversion, which causes respondents both to judge statutory texts to be clear
and to have strong policy preferences about them. While we are skeptical of ambiguity
aversion as a common cause, and struggle to identify some other plausible common
cause, spurious correlation is difficult to rule out. In any event, the correlation between
policy preference and ambiguity rating—spurious or not—disappears when respondents
are asked whether ordinary readers would disagree about the reading of a statute.
Because our analysis below relies only on ruling out reverse causality, spurious
correlation do not undermine the conclusions we draw from our survey results.
Third, most of our survey questions, including the three questions described
above and some others that we do not report, concern criminal cases. If respondents
judge ambiguity in statutes concerning civil matters differently than they judge ambiguity
22

in criminal matters, then one must be wary of extrapolating our results to civil cases—
though our limited examination of statutes that do involve civil rights have produced
similar results.

III.

INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS

Let us begin with a summary of the most straightforward findings suggested by
the data. First, different ways of asking about ambiguity produce different conclusions
about its existence. To ask whether a text is ambiguous, whether it can plausibly be read
more than one way, and whether most people would agree about its meaning could all
reasonably be thought to amount to the same basic question. But those questions are not
answered the same way by people to whom they are put—whether they just arrived at
law school or have been there a year (this made no difference to the results).15 So the
first implication of these results is that discussions of ambiguity in legal interpretation
should be more precise about what sense of ambiguity they have in mind. When courts
and commentators discuss inquire into the ambiguity of a legal text, they use different
formulations that may somewhat resemble all of these possibilities.16

The choice

between them is not usually made explicit or discussed carefully, perhaps because it has
not been clear that it makes much difference.

15

See discussion infra and data in the appendix.

16

For a survey of examples, see Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79

Chi-Kent L. Rev. 859, 866-876 (2004).
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Second, simple judgments of ambiguity create a substantial risk of bias from
policy preferences that the makers of the judgments hold. When respondents are asked
how ambiguous a statute seems or whether two proposed readings of it are plausible,
their judgments about the answers tend to follow the strength of their preferences about
the outcome as a matter of policy: the more strongly they prefer one reading over the
other, the more likely they are to say that the statute is unambiguous or that only one
reading of the text is plausible. In the LSD case for example, when asked for internal
judgments respondents with strong policy preferences are 11-21% more likely to say the
statute is clear than respondents with weak policy preferences. So simple judgments
about ambiguity are entwined with policy preferences, and we suggest that there may
well be a causal relationship between them. The person who has a strong view about
who ought to win a case (for reasons apart from the text) has trouble seeing the
plausibility of other ways of reading the statute involved.
A natural question that follows is whether there is a way to circumvent the bias
that seems to beset simple judgments of ambiguity? An affirmative answer is suggested
by a closer look at the results produced by those different ways of asking about ambiguity
just mentioned. When respondents are asked whether ordinary readers of English would
be likely to agree on the best reading of the statute in that case, their judgments are
unaffected by their policy preferences; respondents who strongly prefer one reading over
another as a matter of policy are as likely as respondents with weak policy preferences to
say that ordinary readers of English would disagree about which is better. To change
slightly the focus of the comparison: In the LSD case, respondents with strong policy
preferences are, on average, 30% more likely to say a statute is ambiguous or probably
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ambiguous when asked for an external judgment than when asked for an internal one. All
respondents considering that case are 55% likely to say the statute is ambiguous when
asked for an external judgment; in other words their likelihood of so concluding does not
change with the strength of their policy preferences.
If we assume that a respondent’s policy preference is in some way a reflection of
personal views, then asking people whether a statute is ambiguous, or whether two
different readings of it are plausible, evidently causes them to consult their own views of
how they would like the statute to be read. We hypothesize that those two questions
amount, in the experience of people who are asked them, to inquiries into how strongly
they themselves feel sure that one reading is better than another, and those judgments are
easily contaminated by the respondents’ preferences—as a matter of policy—for a
particular outcome. Asking respondents whether ordinary readers of English would agree
about the best reading, however, forces them to change their frame of reference. They no
longer are asking themselves which reading they prefer, or how sure they feel that one of
them is right. They are forced to look outside themselves, so to speak, and to consider
what others would likely say. The outward investigation is merely hypothetical—a
thought experiment; but it’s a consequential thought experiment, because it reduces the
bias otherwise exerted by the respondent’s policy preferences. We therefore suggest that
the external question about whether ordinary readers would agree on the meaning of a
text is a useful, though informal, “debiasing” heuristic.17
It would be exciting to translate these findings into implications for how judges
should interpret statutes, but that has to be done with caution. Judges obviously have

17

See generally Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Leg. Stud. 199 (2006).
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experience and training, and also time and materials at their disposal, that the takers of
these surveys don’t; nor does any judge’s method quite line up with the questions we
asked of our respondents. But there may still be at least some cautionary implications for
the judicial process, and other implications as well—for lawyers, for example, and for
those who teach them. The rest of this section pursues these more difficult questions
about the implications of our results.

A. The significance of impressionistic judgments of clarity.

First we should take stock of some differences and similarities between the
positions of our respondents and the position of a judge deciding a statutory dispute.
There are no rules or clear agreements among judges about just how to decide whether a
text is ambiguous. Some students of interpretation do regard textualism as an inquiry
into what “ordinary readers” would think the words of a statute,18 but everyone agrees
there is more even to this judgment than reading the text itself;19 one has to consider the
context—but judges and scholars disagree about what features of context should be

18

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L. Q.

351, 352 (1994); Jonathan Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2007); see also
F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 248 n. 4 (1980) (Scalia, J.).
19

See, e.g., See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists? 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 92

(textualists “believe that a statute may have a clear semantic meaning, even if that meaning is not plain to
the ordinary reader without further examination”).
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admitted into this inquiry.20 Those disagreements usually arise in disputes about what a
statute means, not about whether it is ambiguous, but they can come up in the latter area
as well. On a textualist view the relevant context is semantic, consisting of sources of
lexicographical guidance and the other laws also on the books.21 Thus Justice Scalia’s
suggestion that a textualist seeks to find in a statute “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”22
The takers of our surveys may well be reasonable people, but naturally they do
not have all the materials that a good textualist would want them to have: they are
missing the rest of the corpus juris. Probably a reasonable and conservative view is that
these studies consider just one aspect of decisions about ambiguity: the judgment about
the surface of the text. Clearly there are other points that judges consider in deciding
whether a text is ambiguous, so the significance of the surface and its apparent clarity
shouldn’t be overestimated. But it shouldn’t be underestimated, either. Impressionistic
judgments about the clarity of a text play an important and sometimes decisive role in
litigation over statutes. Consider the X-Citement Video case, which formed the basis of
one of the survey questions shown a moment ago. As the question indicated, the issue in
the case was whether the scienter requirement in the statute extended to the use of
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See id. At 92-93 (2006) (discussing distinction between semantic context and policy context of a

statutory text); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism? 91 Va. L. Rev. 347 (2005); William N Eskridge, The
New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 668-670 (1990).
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See Manning, supra note 19.
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Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1998); see also Nelson, supra note 20, at 353-357.
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underage performers in the movies the defendant sold, or whether the word “knowingly”
only applied to the defendant’s shipment of the films through the mail. The majority held
that the statute required a showing that the defendant knew the movies included minors.
The Court’s decision relied largely on the canons of construction “that some form of
scienter is to be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed, and that a statute is to
be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions.”23
Justice Scalia, however, did not think this reading was “fairly possible”:

[I]t could not be clearer that [the scienter requirement] applies only to the
transportation or shipment of visual depiction in interstate or foreign commerce.
There is no doubt. There is no ambiguity. There is no possible “less natural” but
nonetheless permissible reading.24

Notice that the dispute between the majority and the dissent here really is not about
textualism or other theories of statutory interpretation. It is a feud at an earlier threshold
of analysis; it is about whether the language of the statute will admit of more than one
reading. For making that determination, no theory helps; it is simply a judgment about
the clarity of the English and whether it is reasonable to read it more than one way. It
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United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., supra, 513 U.S. at 69.

24

Id. at 82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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may be that holders of some theories are more likely to answer that question one way
rather than another,25 but the theories themselves are incapable of generating answers.
Another example is furnished by United States v. Yermian,26 which likewise was the
subject of one of the survey questions described above. The question here was similar to
the last one: whether the scienter requirement of the statute required a showing that the
defendant knew his false statement came in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal
agency.

The majority held for the government this time, finding that the statute

“unambiguously dispenses with any requirement that the Government also prove that
those statements were made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.”27 The
dissenters, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the rule of lenity applied
because the statute was ambiguous:

Although there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing plain or
unambiguous language in a statute, the Court's reasoning here amounts to little
more than simply pointing to the ambiguous phrases and proclaiming them clear.
In my view, it is quite impossible to tell which phrases the terms ‘knowingly and

25

See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511,

521 (suggesting that “one who abhors a “plain meaning”' rule, and is willing to permit the apparent
meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating
ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of ‘reasonable’ interpretation that the agency may adopt
and to which the courts must pay deference”).
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468 U.S. 63 (1984).
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Id. at 69.
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willfully’ modify, and the magic wand of ipse dixit does nothing to resolve that
ambiguity.28

Rehnquist was right about at least this much: the majority’s view that the statute was
“unambiguous” was no more than a proclamation—and this in two senses worth noting
distinctly. First, perhaps a proclamation was all that the majority’s judgment about
ambiguity could have been, since, as the dissent states, there is “no errorless test”
(indeed, there is no strictly legal test at all) for deciding whether a text is clear. Again,
there are theories that say what to do when a statute is ambiguous, but there are no
theories that help determine whether a statute is ambiguous, as by offering metrics for
measuring its clarity or standards that the clarity must meet. Judges sometimes do have
different ideas about what to consult while making such determinations; everyone likes
dictionaries,29 but some judges will look at legislative history while others avoid it.30 But
in the end, after consulting whatever there is to be consulted, the decision that words are
or are not ambiguous simply belongs to the maker of the judgment without help from a
legal standard. The “magic wand of ipse dixit” is the standard tool for deciding such
matters, whether for a judge or for respondents to our surveys.
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Id. at 76-77 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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See Lawrence Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2027, 2055 (2005) (“Without
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The Court’s view in Yermian was a “proclamation” without argument in another,
narrower sense as well. It relied heavily on simple judicial reactions to the clarity of the
text. The court’s opinion, like all Supreme Court opinions, did deploy various arguments
besides the ones just shown, and made use of some considerations besides the words
alone; obviously the Justices had more to work with than the respondents to our surveys
did. Yet on reading the opinions for both sides in Yermian, as when reading the opinions
for both sides in the X-Citement Video case, there is no avoiding the fact that
impressionistic judgments are doing important work. Some judges read the text and say
that it just seems clear. Other judges read the same text and say that it just doesn’t.
These disputes are difficult to resolve because, again, there are no legal standards that
quite bear on them, and no way to falsify a judge’s claim one way or the other. If one
person says that both proposed readings of a statute seem plausible, and a colleague
disagrees, finding the second reading too strained, what is there to do about it but for each
to stamp his foot?
This article amounts to an inquiry into that foot-stamping side of interpretation:
the simple judgment that the text seems clear, or doesn’t. Our empirical inquiries suggest
that those judgments, depending how they are undertaken, tend to get entwined with the
policy preferences of their makers. Perhaps this is not surprising; in the absence of any
legal test to guide one’s thought process about clarity, one’s own strong views about
policy might be a natural or at any rate an inevitable place to go for guidance. But the
results also show that those judgments can be disciplined, and the effect of policy
preferences avoided, by using an external inquiry rather than an internal one—by
considering, in other words, not whether a text seems ambiguous to the person making
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the judgment but whether the person thinks ordinary readers of English would be likely to
agree on its meaning. The extent of the discipline exerted on a judge by the “external”
question would be very modest, of course, because judges can’t turn their guesses about
public agreement on a statute’s meaning into serious arguments about it. Nobody wants
statutory cases decided by pollsters who submit evidence of what ordinary people think a
statute means or whether they agree about it.

And predictions of agreement made

without such information—made just on instinct—are sometimes inaccurate, as we shall
see below. Our suggested heuristic, in other words, probably should not and cannot be
made a formal test. But it nevertheless is a possible help for the judge or lawyer who
wants to make a judgment about ambiguity and wishes to reduce the risk that the
judgment will be biased by preferences about the outcome.
In making this recommendation, we might seem to take too much for granted that
judges should keep their ideas about good policy out of their interpretations of statutes,
when in fact there are those who think that a judge’s preferences play an inevitable and
maybe a desirable role in such cases.31 But remember that we are not talking about how a
judge decides what to do in the face of undeniable ambiguity. We are talking about how
a judge decides whether there is ambiguity. It may be the case that a truly ambiguous
statute cannot be interpreted without importing notions of good sense from outside its
four corners, and indeed from the judge’s own fund of experience and opinions. But it
does not follow that the judge’s own strong opinions also have a place in deciding
whether the statute is clear in the first place. That would create a kind of boot-strapping:
judges would consult their policy preferences to decide whether a statute is unclear
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See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6.
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enough to call for the use of their policy preferences. In any event, whether or not
judicial preferences might have a any defensible part to play in decisions about whether a
statute is ambiguous, presumably one would like judges to be able to separate the
question of clarity from their own preferences when the situation calls for it. Our results
suggest that this is difficult—though less so when the decision called for is an “external”
judgment about whether others would be likely to agree on the statute’s meaning.

B. The legal relevance of external judgments of ambiguity.

1. Theories of interpretation.

External judgments of ambiguity are less likely than the internal kind to be biased
by policy preferences, but are they the right sorts of judgments to be making as a legal
matter?

Which perspective—the internal or the external—is more relevant when

considering the ambiguity of a statute? Each of them has some appeal. If literate people
do not, in fact, agree about the meaning of a text, it might seem fatuous for a judge or
anyone else to announce that half of those people are simply wrong: the text isn’t
ambiguous. It seems fatuous because language is customary and conventional.32 Words
mean what people understand them to mean.

If literate people generally think an

utterance means X, it does mean X—and if they disagree about its meaning, then it is
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ambiguous, even if a judge announces that it isn’t, or shouldn’t be—and even if an
idealized reader, rather than an actual ordinary one, would find it perfectly clear. Putting
the linguistic point to one side, using public understandings of meaning as a benchmark
for interpretation also is attractive on “rule of law” grounds: people are entitled to notice
of the rules that govern them. This is a standard defense of textualism as an interpretive
philosophy.33
But the internal perspective has its appeal as well. Consider a survey respondent,
or for that matter a judge, who asks whether a text is ambiguous and isn’t thinking about
how much agreement ordinary readers would likely reach about it. Against what other
benchmark is the reader instead making the judgment? The answer probably involves an
estimate of what the author of the text meant by it. This suggestion is more than just
conjecture. We administered some surveys nearly identical to the ones described above,
but instead asked respondents whether the “purpose” of the statute was ambiguous. We
did not use this variation as often as the other forms of the survey, so the statistical
significance of the result is not yet as great; but the emerging trend of the results is that
asking whether the “purpose” of the statute is ambiguous produces the same results as
simply asking whether the statute was “ambiguous” or whether both readings were
“plausible.” Here, for example, is a graph showing the results when respondents are
shown the fact pattern involving the child pornography statute and asked whether the
statute’s purpose is ambiguous:
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Ambiguous

Probably
ambiguous

Probably not
ambiguous

Not
ambiguous
Strongly
pro-defendant

Mildly
pro-defendant

Mildly
pro-government

Strongly
pro-government

Figure 4. How policy preferences affect judgments about the ambiguity of a statute’s purpose in the
child pornography case (example 2). The line presents mean ambiguity ratings. The whiskers report
standard errors of the means.

Again, respondents with strong policy preferences tend to find the statute’s purpose
unambiguous. Perhaps this should not be surprising: a respondent with a strong policy
preference may find it hard not to project those preferences onto the imagined author of
the statute, presumably a person of good sense who all respondents imagine would have
the same strongly held views that they do. At any rate, notice how similar this curve
looks to the curves generated when respondents are simply asked whether a statute is
ambiguous (without explicit reference to its purpose). Judgments about the ambiguity of
a statute’s purpose correlate with the respondents’ policy preferences just as more general
35

judgments of ambiguity do. While that does not prove that these questions are identical,
it does suggest that asking whether a statute itself is ambiguous and asking whether its
purpose is ambiguous are similar inquiries, that indeed in the experience of many readers
the first question may be hard to distinguishable from the second, and that they provoke
similar recourse to policy preferences.
This focus on the purpose of a statute can be viewed as corresponding to its own
theoretical approach to the interpretation of legal texts: intentionalism. This isn’t the
place to canvass all of the arguments in favor of that approach to interpretation,34 but we
can at least notice a few points that have analogues in the case for textualism just
considered. To begin with the linguistic side of the story: while it’s true that language is
conventional, it also is customary to treat words as flexible carriers of meaning, and, in
interpreting them, to seek the meaning that their author was trying to express. Sometimes
that means declining to take a statement literally, whether in conversation or in court.35
And then there is a policy, or jurisprudential argument, that reinforces this linguistic
point: when judges interpret statutes they generally think of themselves as agents of the
legislature, and interpreters of most schools are understandably uncomfortable reading a
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statute to have effects that nobody wanted it to have just because the words point that
way.36
The textual and intentional approaches to interpretation both have much appeal,
and few judges commit themselves decisively to one or the other. Rather, courts have
time-honored ways to finesse the tensions between them. They commonly say that their
goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, but—or “and”—the best evidence of the
legislature’s intent is the plain meaning of the words it chose, so long as the words are
clear.37 The idea is that evidence of legislative intent and public meaning go together.
But sometimes they don’t, and it is here that textualist and intentionalist interpreters are
most likely to part company. The important point for us, however, is that the courts value
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and routinely give weight to both of the perspectives we are considering here: the public
meaning of a statute (represented in our study by questions about what an ordinary reader
of English would think), and what the legislature intended by it (represented, more or
less, by our questions about whether the statute or its purpose are ambiguous). Few
would argue for the conceptual irrelevance of either (a few very hardy textualists possibly
excepted),38 though there would be much argument about what to admit as evidence to
prove them. If we come at the choice between those goals without considering the risks
of bias raised by the results shown here—if we approach them just by asking which is
more legally relevant—the question quickly becomes not which of them wins out but
how they ought to be balanced. And bear in mind that the question, to be still more
precise, is not how to balance them in general when interpreting a statute, but how to
balance them when making the particular and very important judgment that the language
of a statute is ambiguous.

2. Legal consequences of ambiguity.
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The best answer to that question no doubt depends on why it is asked. The
interpretation of different sorts of texts, including different kinds of statutes, will call for
different emphases. Suppose a federal court is deciding whether a statute is ambiguous
as part of an inquiry under the Chevron doctrine; if the statute is found ambiguous, the
court will defer to any reasonable interpretation by the agency charged with enforcing it.
In this case the intent of Congress, rather than the public meaning of the text, probably is
the more important benchmark if there is a conflict between them, because giving effect
to the intent of Congress is the most widely accepted rationale for the Chevron doctrine:
ambiguities in a statute are treated as delegations of power to the agency in charge of
carrying it out.39

Meanwhile the public interest in notice, though not necessarily

insignificant, may be weaker in regulatory cases than elsewhere—such as in criminal
cases. Of course regulated industries want to know what the law is just as other parties
do, but they do not generally face jail time if they are found to have violated it. More to
the point, remember that we are not, in this Article, quite discussing how statutes should
be finally interpreted. We are discussing how one should decide whether they are
ambiguous, which is a related but distinct question; indeed, it is anterior to the larger one,
because how a statute gets interpreted in the end, or who does the interpreting, will often
depend on whether it is found ambiguous at the outset. In a Chevron case the big
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question is who will do the interpreting: an agency or a court. The interest of a regulated
industry in having clear notice of the answer to that question is, perhaps, not so urgent.
Criminal statutes lie at the other end of the spectrum. The cost to the individual
of overstepping the line may be enormous, so there is a strong interest in having clear
notice of where the line is drawn.

The value of notice in criminal cases receives

venerable recognition in various ways, as in the doctrine that holds overly vague criminal
laws void,40 and as in the rule of lenity, which holds that ambiguous penal statutes should
be construed in favor of defendants.41 Like the Chevron doctrine, the rule of lenity
attaches significance to a finding of ambiguity. But under the rule of lenity, ambiguity
does not affect who interprets the statute. It affects, rather, how the statute is read; it has
immediate consequences for the defendant, who either goes to prison or—if the statute is
found ambiguous in its application to his case—goes free. The rule of lenity turns out to
be a fickle friend to defendants, however, because judges don’t agree about how
ambiguous a statute must be to trigger the rule’s application.42 Their disagreements arise
partly because the doctrine has multiple rationales. One vision of the rule of lenity is that
it “ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered

40

See, e.g., Connally v General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 391 (1926) (holding statute

unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause where “men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”).
41

For a recent statement, see United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (“The rule of lenity

requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them”); see also
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
42

For a more detailed account, see Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 72-73.

40

illegal”;43 thus “where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in
favor of the defendant.”44 The relevance of notice, and thus of a law’s meaning to the
public reader, is stressed in this passage from Justice Scalia, the Court’s most consistent
user of the rule of lenity:

It may well be true that in most cases the proposition that the words of the United
States Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is
something of a fiction, albeit one required in any system of law; but necessary
fiction descends to needless farce when the public is charged even with
knowledge of Committee Reports.45

Another rationale for the rule, quite different in its implications, is that people
should not be imprisoned unless the courts are certain that the legislature intended such a
result. A focus on this side of the rule’s basis results in less generous statements such as
this:
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Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985). See also Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,

160 (1990) (“Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is
rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that
clearly warranted by the text.”).
44

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284-285 (1978).

in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
45

United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 308 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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A statute is not ambiguous for purposes of lenity merely because there is a
division of judicial authority over its proper construction. The rule of lenity
applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.46

These different views of the rule of lenity are not outright inconsistent, but they differ
substantially along precisely the spectrum we have been considering here. The first
places the highest priority on notice to the defendant. The second gives the highest
priority to the legislature’s intent. Everyone acknowledges that both rationales lie behind
the rule, but judges differ in the weight they give to one or to the other.

Those

differences in which rationales to emphasize lead to different views about how much
ambiguity to require, and what sort of ambiguity to require, before invoking the rule.
The empirical work presented here suggests a ground for approaching the
threshold judgment about the rule of lenity—whether the statute is ambiguous—in a
manner that is weighted more toward the notice-ensuring rationale for the rule, and thus
on an externally-driven inquiry into public meaning: would ordinary readers of English
interpret the statute the same way? The answer to that external question has a solid claim
to legal relevance, and it is unlikely to get entwined with a judge’s own views about the
whether the defendant should be punished as a matter of policy. An attempt to say
whether a statute is ambiguous without reference to anyone else, but just by reference to
the reader’s own opinion or the reader’s ideas about the purpose of the rule, raises greater
risks that the judgment will reflect the policy preferences of its maker.
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Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995).
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External judgments have an additional consequence worth noting. They are more
likely than internal judgments to produce a judgment that a text is ambiguous. This
might be considered salutary because it implies a kind of humility; internal judgments
tend toward confidence, which is tempered by the external question about whether others
would agree. But the consequences can also be viewed more practically. Finding
ambiguity more often has, as we have seen, different implications in different legal
settings. It means deferring to agencies more often in administrative law cases. It might
mean resorting more often in statutory cases to legislative history, or perhaps to a judge’s
own views of policy—whatever one takes to be the next step once a statute is found to
fairly admit of more than one reading. In a criminal case, it means resorting to the rule of
lenity more often. Whether these outcomes are benefits or detriments of asking the
external question will depend on one’s views about the policies at stake in each area.47

C. The accuracy of external judgments of ambiguity.

A question remains, however. Supposing external judgments of ambiguity to be
of some legal interest, and supposing them to be less biased than judgments of the
“internal” variety—still, are they right? A claim that ordinary readers would disagree
about the meaning of a text is empirical in nature; unlike a mere internal feeling of
confidence about the best meaning of a text, an external claim can, in principle, be proven
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See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 18 at 374 (“If the rise of textualism means the decline of the deference

doctrine, either in the short or the long run, then this alone is cause for concern. It may suggest one reason
to reject textualism”).
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or falsified by consulting ordinary readers and learning whether they did, in fact, agree or
disagree about it.

We investigated the accuracy of the predictions as far as our

methodology allowed. It might be open to question whether the respondents to this
survey were representative of “ordinary readers of English”; all of them were college
graduates with an interest in law. In any event, some groups of respondents were asked
which reading of the statutes involved they thought was better. By comparing their
agreement in answering this question with the predictions of others about whether readers
would agree, we can make a start at saying how accurate those predictions were.
To summarize the results involving the survey questions already seen:

i. In the problem involving how LSD should be weighed, respondents tended to
underestimate how much disagreement the statute would produce. 19% said that there
would be “widespread disagreement” about the statute’s meaning; 36% said there would
“probably” be disagreement; 39% expected that “most people” would agree; and 6%
thought that everyone would agree. We also ran a variation in which respondents were
asked more simply, “Do you think ordinary readers of English would disagree about
which reading better fits the statute’s text?" They were asked to answer yes or no, with
no option for “probably” or “probably not.” When pressed in this way, 64% predicted
disagreement and 36% predicted agreement. In fact disagreement was widespread; this
was the most ambiguous of the statutes we tested, when ambiguity is measured by
agreement: there was a 51%-49% split among respondents with respect to which reading
of the text was better.

44

By way of comparison, how well did respondents’ internal judgments of
ambiguity square with the amount of actual disagreement found among other readers?
When respondents were asked just to say whether the text was ambiguous (yes or no),
56% of those with mild policy preferences found ambiguity while only 30% of
respondents with strong policy preferences did. To state the overall result perhaps more
cleanly: respondents making external judgments were twice as likely to find ambiguity
as were respondents who made internal judgments and had strong policy preferences.
(Respondents who made internal judgments but did not have strong policy preferences
found ambiguity about as often as those who made external judgments.) So external
judgments of ambiguity, however imprecise, were more accurate than the internal kind
when measured against the actual disagreement readers had about the meaning of the
text.

ii. In the problem based on the child pornography case, 62% of respondents
thought that ordinary readers would probably or definitely disagree about the best reading
of the statute. With the middle options taken away (the variation explained a moment
ago), 77% of respondents said that ordinary readers would disagree about “which reading
better fits the statute’s text.” In fact there was a 66%-33% split of respondents on the
best reading of the statute (66% believed the government’s reading was correct). Again
by way of comparison, when instead asked whether the text was “ambiguous”, 73% of
respondents with mild policy preferences said that it was, as against 40% of those with
strong policy preferences. Here as in the LSD case, those who made external judgments
were twice as likely to find ambiguity as those who made internal judgments and had
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strong policy preferences; and here again, there was no significant difference between
external judgments and internal judgments made by those with no strong policy
preference.

iii. In the problem based on the false statements case, 60% said that the statute
would definitely or probably produce disagreement.

With the “probably” options

removed, and respondents forced to make a binary choice, 75% predicted disagreement.
Those who predicted disagreement were, again, right; 55% of respondents thought the
government’s reading was better, and 45% thought the defendant’s reading was better..
To compare these results once again to the accuracy of internal judgments of ambiguity
that respondents made:

when asked the “ambiguity” question, roughly 55% of

respondents with mild policy preferences predicted disagreement, while only 15% of
respondents with strong policy preferences, on average, predicted disagreement. Of the
respondents who strongly preferred the government’s reading as a matter of policy
preference, none of them thought the statute had any ambiguity. Those who made
external judgments were five times as likely to find ambiguity as those who made internal
judgments and had strong policy preferences.

As usual, there was little difference

between external judgments and the subset of internal judgments that were made by those
without strong policy preferences.

The results just described suggest that the external judgments of the “crowd”—
that is, the respondents taken as a whole—generally went in the right direction: if a
majority of the respondents predicted disagreement (definitely or probably), there usually
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was a lot of disagreement. But of course all of those problems involved statutes where
disagreement was indeed widespread. What about cases where it wasn’t? Here is an
example that is interesting by way of contrast. We asked the following question:48

A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), provides an additional six month prison
sentence for anyone who "uses" a firearm "in relation to . . . a drug trafficking
offense." Defendant, a drug dealer, owned a gun. He approached a confederate
and offered to trade him the gun for some cocaine. His confederate turned out to
be an undercover police officer, and defendant was arrested. He was charged
with violating 924(c).

Defendant did not brandish the gun or use it in a

threatening manner, but he did offer it as an item of barter.

The question is whether offering the gun in trade was a "use" of it within the
meaning of 924(c) (in which case the defendant gets the extra six-month prison
sentence). Defendant's reading is that offering a gun in trade is not a "use." The
government's reading is that it is a "use."

This statute was not particularly ambiguous in the external and empirical sense of the
term: 80% of respondents thought the better reading was the defendant’s.49 An 80/20
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Based on Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), where the Court held, 6-3, in favor of the

government.
49

An amusing feature of the responses to the firearms problem—or perhaps a troubling one: most

respondents agreed that the best reading of the statute was one that, unbeknownst to them, the Supreme
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split does not amount to overwhelming agreement, but it makes this statute considerably
less ambiguous than, say, the statute involving LSD.

Yet when pressed to choose

between a prediction that readers would agree or disagree about the gun statute’s
meaning, 74% predicted disagreement; in other words, predictions of disagreement were
about as common here as they were elsewhere. This is the most extreme example of a
trend that recurred in milder form elsewhere in the results: respondents as a group often
overestimated the ambiguity of statutes that actually provoked relatively large amounts of
agreement. In the more typical cases that provoked wide agreement, about half of all
respondents predicted that result; see the appendix for a more detailed account of these
questions and results. This case about gun use also is a rare example of an instance
where internal judgments about ambiguity were more accurate than the external ones.
Both groups found a lot of ambiguity, but the external judgers found more of it; and in
fact, as we have said, most respondents agreed on the statute’s actual meaning.
It is tempting to say that people tend to expect more disagreement than really
exists and should compensate by reminding themselves of this, but that advice would be
too strong. For at the same time, some people’s predictions were just right, and there
were many others who predicted too much clarity when it didn’t exist.

The safe

statements are that people vary in their ability to accurately predict agreement about the
meaning of legal texts, that collective judgments on the subject often are roughly
accurate, but that in some cases they go awry.

Court rejected as unambiguously wrong in that case; the majority at the Court held that the statute did
impose liability on the defendant for bartering his gun. See Smith, supra note 44.
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The difficulty of making accurate predictions about the disagreement that a text
will provoke obviously counsels care and humility in venturing such judgments. But
what does it suggest about the choice between the external and internal ways of asking
about ambiguity? The external question produced a lot of inaccurate answers, but the
internal questions produce even more inaccuracies when the answers to them are
measured against the amount of actual agreement that readers reached. In other words,
people asked just to say how ambiguous a statute is, or whether two readings of it both
are plausible, tend to produce answers that don’t square with the amount of agreement or
disagreement the text produces among actual readers. The significance of this inaccuracy
is open to question. People who make internal judgments aren’t trying to predict how
much agreement ordinary readers would reach about the text, so perhaps it isn’t fair to
measure the accuracy of their answers by looking to that benchmark. On the other hand,
what benchmark is the right one for deciding whether an internal judgment was correct?
The most probable answer, and the one most consistent with our discussion earlier, is that
an internal judgment is correct when it accurately arrives at the intention of whoever
wrote the text. Accuracy of that kind is impossible to measure through studies of this
kind, and may be impossible in a larger and stronger sense; in litigation over a statute, the
“intent of the legislature” is often difficult to discern, and some textualists deny that it
exists in any coherent sense.50 And even if it can be determined in some cases, in others
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See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547 (1983) (“[b]ecause

legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents' or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable . . .
[t]he body as a whole . . . has only outcomes.” ); for recent contrary arguments, see Lawrence M. Solan,
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it is evident that the legislature had no clear intent concerning the question at hand. Some
argue that the “best” answer then is the one that legislators would have reached if they
had thought about the matter,51 which of course is even less susceptible of proof or
falsification.
So if we are comparing the external and internal strategies for deciding whether a
text is ambiguous, the contest between them is complicated by the differences in whether
and how they can be tested. What we do know is that along the dimensions that we do
have the ability to test, the external question does better: it produces judgments less
entwined with the policy preferences of their makers, and it produces judgments that,
while crude, are better estimates of how much agreement ordinary readers would reach
about the text.52 It is certainly possible to reject all this on the ground that disagreement

Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role or Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93
Geo. L. J. 427 (2005).
51

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.

Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817 (1983); William Funk, Faith in Texts—Justice Scalia’s Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution: Apostasy for the Rest of Us? 49 Admin. L. Rev. 825 (1997) (“This is the great irony of
Justice Scalia's textualism; judges acting in good faith in the face of an ambiguous text, if they are not to
look to legislative history, must necessarily impose their view of the law on the law.”). Compare Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (Scalia, J., ) (“The question . . . is not what Congress ‘would
have wanted’ but what Congress enacted . . . ”). For general discussion, see Nelson, supra note 20 at 403416; Eskridge, supra note 20, at 630-632..
52

Of course the debiasing effect of the ordinary readers question cannot be separated from the level effect

of that question. So while the “ordinary readers” framing helps to separate textual interpretation from
policy preference, it would also increase the probability that judges find a statute ambiguous. If the
consequence of ambiguity is that a judge is free to appeal to his or her own policy preferences in
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among ordinary readers of a statutory text is irrelevant to its “actual” ambiguity; but then
those judgments of “actual” ambiguity aren’t tethered to anything clear, and are quite
hazardous in ways we have shown—while meanwhile the external judgments do have a
legitimate claim to legal relevance in some circumstances, as we also have argued.
The difficulty of making accurate estimates of how much people will agree about
legal texts may finally suggest that it would be valuable to develop pedagogical tools for
improving those predictive abilities. Indeed, all of the issues discussed in this Article
would benefit from closer pedagogical attention. One of the striking findings of these
experiments, noted briefly above, was the absence lack of any significant differences
between the judgments made by respondents when they first arrive at law school and
after they have been there for a year.

This may suggest that patterns of judgment we

have found are embedded deeply enough in most people that they are beyond the reach of
formal education to change, at least once the makers of the judgments have reached
young adulthood. Or it may suggest instead—or in addition—that law schools do not do
as much as they might to teach students about the interpretation of statutes and the
hazards that attend the process. This probably is true; the emphasis during the first year
at most law schools continues to be on the study of the common law. There typically are
some exceptions at various points in the courses on civil procedure and criminal
procedure, but sustained attention to the interpretation of statutes is unusual.53 Or has
been unusual; some schools have begun introducing courses on statutory interpretation in

interpreting a statute, see supra Section III.B.2, the “ordinary reader” framing may not, in the end, actually
reduce the role of policy preferences in interpretation.
53

For notes on this and sighs of regret, see Scalia, supra note 22, at 3-13.
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the first year.54 Such training might also come later in law school, of course, but by then
students generally make their own choices about what courses to take; relatively few of
them sign up for courses that focus tightly on interpretation. Moreover, we think it is
widely felt by most who have gone through the experience that the first year of law
school tends to make the biggest dent on the student’s habits of thought.
These pedagogical suggestions are not just a question, or perhaps even mostly a
question, of helping people who eventually will become judges to make sound external
judgments of ambiguity, or less biased internal judgments about it. Those external
judgments cannot be more than a heuristic, or thought experiment, in the best of
circumstances anyway. It is very important, though, for those who write statutes—or
who write contracts or other legal instruments—to be able to accurately forecast whether
their writings will produce agreement or disagreement by later readers trying to
understand what the writings mean. And it is very important for those lawyers who read
statutes and other legal texts to be able to accurately predict what others will think about
their meaning. Most law schools do not now provide very extensive instruction or
practice in making those judgments. Our results suggest that there is a lot yet to learn and
teach about them.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Judgments about whether a text is ambiguous are of great importance in law. The
experiments presented in this Article suggest, first, that judgments about ambiguity also
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See Ethan Lieb, [new article in Journal of Legal Education.]
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are dangerous, because they are easily biased by strong policy preferences that the
makers of the judgments hold. A second finding, however, is that ambiguity is itself
ambiguous, and that different ways of inquiring about it produce different answers.55
Asking whether there is more than one plausible way to read a statute, or simply whether
the statute seems ambiguous to the reader, is not the same as asking whether the reader
thinks the text would likely be interpreted the same way by ordinary readers of English.
That is a second finding of this Article, and it suggests that when courts and scholars
argue about the ambiguity of a text, they ought to be more precise about what they mean.
A third finding is that the choice between these different ways of thinking about
ambiguity has practical significance.

The answers to the first two questions just

described—the ones that call for the reader’s own “internal” judgments of a statute’s
clarity—are strongly correlated with, and probably are influenced by, the intensity of the
respondent’s policy preferences about the issues involved.

The answers to the last

question—the “external” question of whether ordinary readers would agree on the
meaning of a text—are not likewise correlated with policy preferences. This suggests
that answers to the external question are less likely to be biased by the policy judgments
of the judge or other person answering it. And external estimates of ambiguity, while
sometimes inaccurate, are nevertheless more accurate than internal judgments when
measured by the amount of agreement readers are able to reach about a statute.
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For discussion of some ambiguities embedded in the notion of ambiguity, which overlaps with some of

this paper’s concerns but also explores other aspects of the point, see Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious
Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 859 (2004); see also William D. Popkin, A
DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2007) (discussing different senses of “ambiguity”).
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The advantages of external inquiries into ambiguity cannot and should not be
formalized into a rule for legal use, and this for several reasons. Such inquiries cannot be
made rigorous; agreements that ordinary readers would reach about a text vary in their
legal relevance; and our results, while suggestive, are based on experiments that do not
involve judges. Moreover, no theory of interpretation calls for judges to make decisions
about meaning or ambiguity on materials as slender as the respondents to our survey
instruments used; everyone agrees that more context of various sorts is needed to reach a
sound conclusion. But impressionistic judgments of clarity, not much different from the
kind called for in our surveys, do seem to figure importantly in many actual cases, and
they routinely figure as at least one component of most decisions about statutory
meaning. The external perspective on the ambiguity of a statute can serve as a useful
heuristic in such cases where the clarity of a text is open to question, especially in areas
of law where parties—or “ordinary readers” of the legal text in question—have a strong
interest in notice. The external question is a valuable corrective to the serious risks of
bias that attend the more usual task of simply asking whether a statute seems clear to
oneself.
Last and more generally, we suggest that experimental inquiries have much to
offer the study of legal interpretation. Making sense out of texts is perhaps the most
common work of a judge or lawyer; but while we have vast bodies of theory about how
this ought to be done, we know rather little about how it is in fact done. As the inquiries
presented here have shown, ideas about interpretation that sometimes are taken for
granted can turn out to contain latent ambiguities. They also may be subject to bias, or to
entwinement with considerations that are not at all evident from the accounts people give
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of their opinions about a text’s meaning.

Controlled experiments have inevitable

limitations—but so do theories unchecked by empirical results.
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APPENDIX

This appendix provides additional detail on the methods used to generate our
results and the raw data on which the principal findings in the text are based.

A.

General Notes on Data Pool.

The data discussed in this article come from several administrations of our survey
at the Boston University, University of Chicago, and University of Virginia law schools.
Our primary survey had 903 respondents. Roughly 50% of the respondents were from
BU (492 respondents), 17% were from University of Chicago (158 respondents), and
33% were from UVA (253 respondents). Roughly 66% of the respondents took the
survey during their first week of law school (583 respondents) and 34% of them at the
end of their first year (293 respondents).
Each respondent was asked questions about eleven different statutes and
accompanying fact patterns. Any given respondent was asked only one type of ambiguity
question throughout the survey, and as indicated in the raw data tables below, each type
of question received between 60 and 500 individual responses. This variation exists
because of our experimental design choices; there were many different versions of the
survey that put the questions into different order, and some questions occurred more
frequently overall than others. Respondents were given seven cases to consider other
than the four discussed in the text of this Article. We do not report the results from those
questions here because they were written differently and used to explore other questions
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about statutory interpretation.56 We also administered a slightly different version of the
survey in autumn 2008. This secondary survey required respondents to say that a statute
was ambiguous or was not, without intermediate possibilities. It was given to 262
incoming first-year law students, and as discussed briefly in the text of this article, it
confirmed our major findings.57

B.

Raw data: judgments of ambiguity and policy.

Reproduced here is the raw data from which we generated each figure and the
regression analysis in the text of the article. The various judgments about ambiguity that
respondents chose are listed along the left side of each table; the columns represent the
policy preferences the respondents claimed to have.
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For example, some of the questions included “framing” that indicated whether a lower court agreed with

the defendant or the government. The purpose of such framing was to test the possibility that lower court
judgments alter interpretation, policy preferences, or assessments of ambiguity. That question will be the
subject of further research and reporting elsewhere.
57

One other question in the first version of the survey, and two other questions in the more recent version

of it, did produce substantial data similar to the data discussed in the text. Those questions were based on
statutes that involved carjacking, possession of firearms, and carrying of firearms. In each case the results
produced support our findings; but with respect to each of those three cases, we tested two rather than three
of the ambiguity questions described in this article.

They therefore illuminate the issues under

consideration here a little less directly than the cases discussed in the article, and this is why we are not
presenting them in detail. Those questions and the data they produced are available from the authors on
request.
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LSD: Ambiguous as applied?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

4%

9%

3%

7%

Probably Ambiguous

26%

32%

41%

23%

Probably Not Ambiguous

36%

41%

39%

32%

Not Ambiguous

34%

17%

17%

39%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

95

99

90

44

LSD: Both readings plausible?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

4%

7%

11%

7%

Probably Ambiguous

27%

57%

48%

26%

Probably Not Ambiguous

41%

28%

32%

30%

Not Ambiguous

29%

7%

9%

37%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

49

68

44

27

LSD: Ordinary readers agree?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

23%

14%

14%

22%

Probably Ambiguous

30%

39%

40%

26%

Probably Not Ambiguous

36%

38%

43%

44%

Not Ambiguous

11%

9%

2%

7%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

47

56

42

27

***
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Child pornography: Ambiguous as
applied?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

4%

12%

6%

2%

Probably Ambiguous

31%

45%

42%

22%

Probably Not Ambiguous

45%

33%

38%

51%

Not Ambiguous

20%

11%

15%

25%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

49

95

157

150

Child pornography: Both readings
plausible?

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

19%

21%

20%

12%

Probably Ambiguous

24%

35%

39%

32%

Probably Not Ambiguous

29%

41%

35%

40%

Not Ambiguous

29%

3%

6%

16%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

21

34

66

68

Child pornography: Ordinary readers
agree?

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

24%

19%

13%

20%

Probably Ambiguous

35%

52%

47%

39%

Probably Not Ambiguous

35%

22%

34%

39%

Not Ambiguous

6%

7%

6%

2%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

17

27

68

51
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Child pornography: Purpose
Ambiguous?

Strong Pro-G

Mild Pro-G Mild Pro-D Strong Pro-D

Ambiguous

9%

21%

25%

0%

Probably Ambiguous

26%

37%

25%

60%

Probably Not Ambiguous

43%

32%

50%

20%

Not Ambiguous

22%

11%

0%

20%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

23

19

12

5

Ambiguous as Applied?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G

Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

0%

18%

3%

2%

Probably Ambiguous

21%

41%

49%

10%

Probably Not Ambiguous

47%

33%

33%

50%

Not Ambiguous

31%

8%

15%

38%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

70

127

147

109

plausible?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G

Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

0%

11%

8%

0%

Probably Ambiguous

36%

69%

58%

23%

Probably Not Ambiguous

50%

20%

29%

45%

Not Ambiguous

14%

0%

5%

32%

***

False Statement:

False Statement: Both readings

60

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total Responses

28

61

76

22

agree?

Strong Pro-D

Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

28%

22%

10%

21%

Probably Ambiguous

40%

45%

43%

32%

Probably Not Ambiguous

24%

29%

43%

32%

Not Ambiguous

8%

3%

5%

5%

Total Percentage

100%

100%

100%

89%

Total Responses

25

58

61

19

False Statement: ordinary readers

C.

Raw data: accuracy of judgments that statutes were ambiguous.

In Section III.C. above, we discuss the accuracy of respondents’ external
judgments about ambiguity. The measurement of actual ambiguity, which serves as a
benchmark for deciding whether respondents were accurate in predicting it, comes from
respondents’ judgments about which reading best fit the statute’s text.

The more

agreement there was among respondents about how best to read a statute, the less
ambiguous we consider the statute in fact (in the most extreme cases there was 93 – 95%
agreement that one reading was best). Below we reproduce the raw data used to generate
this analysis of external judgments.
As discussed in Section I of this appendix, we administered two types of surveys.
The primary survey gave respondents four choices concerning ambiguity: not ambiguous,
probably not ambiguous, probably ambiguous, and ambiguous (Table A1).
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The

secondary survey forced respondents to choose between two choices: ambiguous and not
ambiguous (Table A2). In the “Statute” column below, we list the case name in the first
column. (Some cases are listed more than once because we used more than one version
of them, introducing slight variations in phrasing or details to see if they made any
difference). In the second column, “Better Text Actual Agreement,” we provide the
percentage of all respondents who agreed about which reading best fit the statute’s text.
In the remaining columns we provide the percentages for each ambiguity response.

TABLE A1
Better Text Actual

% Not

% Probably Not

% Probably

STATUTE

Agreement

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

% Ambiguous

LSD

51%

6%

39%

36%

19%

False Statement

59%

7%

34%

42%

18%

Child pornography

61%

4%

34%

44%

18%

Gun Use

76%

6%

32%

44%

18%

TABLE A2
Better Text Actual

% Not

STATUTE

Agreement

Ambiguous

% Ambiguous

LSD

51%

36%

64%

False Statement

55%

25%

75%

Child pornography

66%

23%

77%

Gun Use

80%

26%

74%
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D.

Raw data: respondents who took the survey before their first year of law school
(fall) versus respondents who took the survey after one year of law school
(spring).

It is reasonable to hypothesize that after a year of law school, respondents have
become more aware of the distinction between their own policy preference and the best
reading of a text, and the risk of the former consideration infecting the latter judgment.
The data shows, however, that the textual judgments made by both groups are similarly
entwined (or, when making external judgments, unentwined) with their policy
preferences. As an example, we provide the raw data from the LSD statute below. There
is no significant difference between the fall and spring numbers.

LSD: Ambiguous as Applied (FALL)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

5%

9%

4%

7%

Probably Ambiguous

27%

33%

42%

23%

Probably Not Ambiguous

36%

41%

40%

30%

Not Ambiguous

32%

17%

15%

40%

Ambiguity Score

2.05

2.33

2.34

1.97

Total Responses

59

70

53

30

LSD: Ambiguous as Applied (SPRING)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

3%

10%

4%

8%

Probably Ambiguous

26%

33%

41%

23%

Probably Not Ambiguous

37%

38%

37%

31%

Not Ambiguous

34%

18%

19%

38%
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Ambiguity Score

1.97

2.36

2.30

2.00

Total Responses

35

39

27

13

LSD: Plausible (FALL)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

3%

8%

10%

6%

Probably Ambiguous

24%

60%

47%

29%

Probably Not Ambiguous

44%

25%

33%

29%

Not Ambiguous

29%

8%

10%

35%

Ambiguity Score

2.00

2.68

2.57

2.06

Total Responses

34

40

30

17

LSD: Plausible (SPRING)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

5%

5%

13%

14%

Probably Ambiguous

24%

55%

44%

14%

Probably Not Ambiguous

43%

32%

38%

29%

Not Ambiguous

29%

9%

6%

43%

Ambiguity Score

2.05

2.55

2.63

2.00

Total Responses

21

22

16

7

LSD: Ordinary Readers (FALL)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

21%

15%

15%

21%

Probably Ambiguous

31%

38%

38%

29%

Probably Not Ambiguous

38%

38%

42%

43%

Not Ambiguous

10%

9%

4%

7%

Ambiguity Score

2.62

2.59

2.65

2.64

Total Responses

29

34

26

14
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LSD: Ordinary Readers (SPRING)

Strong Pro-D Mild Pro-D Mild Pro-G Strong Pro-G

Ambiguous

22%

15%

14%

29%

Probably Ambiguous

28%

35%

36%

29%

Probably Not Ambiguous

39%

40%

43%

29%

Not Ambiguous

11%

10%

7%

14%

Ambiguity Score

2.61

2.55

2.57

2.71

Total Responses

18

20

14

7
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